Cryptographic Fix for US Elections Remains Unimplemented Despite Known Vulnerabilities

A former voting machine auditor reveals that U.S. election systems still lack basic cryptographic safeguards to detect ballot tampering or duplication. Michal Pospieszalski, a software engineer who audited Election Systems & Software's iVotronic system in 2006, found glaring flaws including bad code practices, backdoors, and static passwords—issues he claims persist today.

The critical missing element, according to Pospieszalski, is end-to-end cryptographic proofs. Without them, voting machines cannot verify ballot legitimacy or prevent multiple counts of the same ballot. Despite identifying these vulnerabilities nearly two decades ago, election vendors have yet to address them, citing a lack of legal pressure or updated election laws.

Pospieszalski's proposed solution involves implementing cryptographic proofs—without blockchain—to secure future elections and restore public trust. The continued inaction highlights systemic risks in U.S. election infrastructure, leaving it vulnerable to manipulation.